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Subnational institutions and open innovation: Evidence from China 
Abstract 
Under what subnational institutional conditions does open innovation strategy enhance the innovativeness 
of emerging market enterprises (EMEs)? Using a novel dataset of Chinese high-tech manufacturing firms 
over the period of 2008 and 2011, we show that although on average openness to external actors improves 
innovation performance this effect is pronounced for EMEs that operate in subnational regions with a 
higher level of intellectual property rights (IPR) enforcement and of factor market development. Our 
findings point to the context-dependent nature of open innovation strategy and the complementary effect 
of institutional parameters in emerging markets and help to reconcile the contrasting findings regarding 
the effect of open innovation in the prior literature.  
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1. Introduction 
Open innovation (OI) strategy emphasizes the importance of openness to external knowledge sources 
such as suppliers, customers, and competitors, as opposed to the traditional ‘closed innovation’ model in 
which firms innovate solely on the basis of their in-house capabilities (Chesbrough, 2003; Lauren and 
Salter, 2006; 2014). Prior studies have provided valuable insights indicating that the OI strategy 
overcomes the liability of un-connectedness (Chesbrough, 2003) and improves a firm’s patenting success 
and development of new products (Laursen and Salter, 2014; Noh, 2015; Zhang et al., 2017). Openness in 
innovation process may be particularly important for latecomer emerging market enterprises (EMEs) to 
catch up in the global battle for technology leadership because these firms need to draw in knowledge 
from external sources to compensate for their lack of internal capabilities (Hong et al., 2015; Kafouros et 
al., 2015) and develop innovation.  
Prior studies, drawing upon institutional theory (North, 1990), acknowledge that well-developed 
institutions support innovative activities by providing innovation infrastructure, factor markets and 
protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) that reduces uncertainty and transaction costs and 
facilitates market-based exchanges (Khanna and Yafeh, 2007; Zhang and Zheng, 2017). However, these 
studies often assume that the institutional context remains the same across different subnational regions 
within a given country and, as a result, the role of subnational institutions in shaping the performance 
outcomes of OI is under-theorized. This neglect is surprising because institutions are heterogeneous 
across subnational regions within a country (North, 1990; Wang et al., 2015) that may account for 
variations in the performance outcomes of the OI strategy between firms. Furthermore, prior assumptions 
and findings that have informed the OI theory and managers are largely based on studies of developed 
countries where firms have strong internal capabilities and operate in institutional environments that 
encourage innovative activities. The significant ways in which EMEs differ from their counterparts in 
developed economies in terms of internal capabilities and institutional context limit scholarly 
understanding of what shapes the performance outcomes of EMEs’ open innovation.  
This study aims to address these research gaps by developing and testing a context-dependent 
perspective of OI using a sample of high-tech Chinese manufacturing firms. Building on previous 
advances (e.g., Hong et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015), we join the literatures on OI and institution-based 
view in trying to consider the participatory and endogenous role of subnational institutions in shaping the 
outcomes of OI. We posit that there are significant variations in institutions across subnational regions 
within a given emerging country such as China that create both opportunities and challenges for EMEs’ 
innovative activities which in turn depict the boundary conditions with respect to when OI strategy 
enhances innovation performance. Specifically, we consider three region-specific institutions, namely the 
levels of IPR enforcement, factor market development and intermediation market development, and 
propose that other things being equal, these cross-regional differences in institutions can explain 
variations in the effect of OI strategy on innovation performance.  The analysis of subnational institutions 
is important because it extends prior theoretical predictions by explaining why firms with similar 
characteristics can yield different returns from OI and why this innovation model is likely to be more 
beneficial in some regions than in others. By demonstrating how location-specific institutional 
idiosyncrasies influence the effectiveness of the OI model, our study advances understanding of how and 
which institutions influence the performance outcomes of OI and also provides guidelines for how 
managers should formulate strategies of openness and maximize the benefits from OI.  
Because China has a large number of sub-national regions that demonstrate a significant 
heterogeneity in institutional landscape (Hong et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015), it offers a promising 
context in which to explore the relationship between OI, region-specific institutions and innovation 
performance. We examine these relationships using a longitudinal dataset of 438 Chinese high-tech 
manufacturing firms during 2008–2011. Our findings indicate that the effect of OI on performance is 
stronger for Chinese firms in regions with stronger IPR enforcement and with a higher level of factor 
market development. Although our analysis focuses mainly on China, a number of the predictions of our 
framework could be adapted to other emerging economies. 
2. Theoretical framework  
2.1 Benefits and costs of open innovation model 
The OI model emphasizes the importance of opening up of innovation process to external players for 
developing innovation (Chesbrough, 2003; Lauren and Salter, 2006; 2014). It suggests that the 
advantages of merely focusing on the development of internal capabilities have declined and, as a result, 
the importance of openness to and interaction with external partners has increased (Chesbrough, 2003). 
OI differs from academic collaborations defined as a firm’s involvement with universities and research 
institutes (URIs) or other academic institutions in its process of developing innovations (Kafouros et al., 
2015). It is wider than academic collaborations in terms of the scope of external engagement and involves 
not only academic institutions but also all other types of external players such as suppliers, customers, 
and competitors. Academic collaborations can be a key part of a firm openness depending on the extent to 
which a firm relies on academic institutions vs other external players in its external engagement of 
technological collaborations.  
The OI model offers a number of advantages over the ‘closed’ innovation model where a firm 
develops and commercializes innovations largely within its own boundary (Chesbrough, 2003). First, the 
OP model enhances firms’ ability to create innovation. The opening up of innovation process by 
integrating  external actors helps firms find sources of variety in resources and knowledge, enabling them 
to replace one set of knowledge-intensive factors with an alternative one (Jacobides et al., 2006). 
Openness to competitors, for example, allows firms to gain access to complementary knowledge and 
skills and track and monitor these competitors’ activities which can guide and shape their own innovative 
efforts (Laursen and Salter, 2014). Similarly, collaboration with URIs enables firms to acquire new 
scientific knowledge, experiment with alternative designs, and explore new technological paths (Kafouros 
et al., 2015).  
Second, openness to external knowledge sources enables firms to better appropriate returns from 
innovations (Memili et al., 2015). Integrating customers into the innovation process, for example, helps 
the firm respond more deftly to changes in consumer preferences, refine technology directions, and 
increase the likelihood of market acceptance of new products (Wu and Olk, 2014). Furthermore, because 
protection from imitation in emerging economies such as China depends not only on the law but also on 
the discretion of government agencies (LaPorta et al., 1997), collaborating with government agencies 
helps EMEs protect proprietary technology and therefore increase value capture from innovation.  
However, OI may also have a negative effect on innovation performance. Opening of innovation 
processes incurs costs associated with searching for and coordinating an increasing number of new 
collaborations (Berchicci, 2013). Over-reliance on external collaborations can hinder development of 
internal R&D processes which may ultimately hamper the firm’s ability to capture and assimilate external 
knowledge (Berchicci, 2013). Technological collaborations with partners with different routines and 
mechanisms can create significant ‘switching’ costs because of the context-specific nature of these 
routines and mechanisms (Lhuillery and Pfister 2009). Furthermore, opening up of innovation process can 
lead to loss of knowledge and innovation skills (Laursen and Salter, 2014). Empirical evidence is in line 
with these arguments, showing that excessive reliance on external collaborations reduces a firm’s 
innovative performance (Caputo et al., 2016; Laursen and Salter, 2006).  
2.2 The role of institutions in open innovation  
Institutions set the rules that form a country’s legal infrastructure and incentive structures that 
govern economic transactions (North, 1990; Scott, 1995). As firms are an integral part of the national or 
regional institutional environment (Hong et al., 2015; North, 1990), their innovation decisions, strategy 
and performance are influenced by a multitude of institutional forces which either promote or hinder the 
upgrading of existing capabilities. An institutional approach is central to understanding the forces that 
shape EMEs’ innovation outcomes because it helps us explain differences in innovation performance that 
do not result from variations in organizational factors.  
Institutions influence OI and its outcomes in three ways. First, institutions influence the willingness 
of EMEs to engage in the opening up of innovation process. The regulatory forces, for example, can exert 
pressures through laws, regulations and policies that influence the inclination of EMEs’ managers to 
engage in external technological partnerships. Similarly, normative expectations influence the willingness 
of EME managers to open up innovation process. These managers are more likely to adopt an OI strategy 
when they believe that openness to external knowledge sources will increase sales and ultimately boost 
their career prospects.  
Second, institutions influence the ability of EMEs to utilize the OI model effectively. Well-
developed capital markets, intermediaries and contract enforcement laws facilitate R&D collaborations. 
Innovation intermediaries such as universities, regional trade associations, and technical assistance 
centers, for example, play the role of boundary spanners that help to overcome information asymmetry 
and bridge suppliers and customers (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). Institutions also influence the 
effectiveness of OI strategy by affecting how firms have differential access to critical external resources, 
such as labour, capital and knowledge (Wang et al., 2015). Third, IPR regime affects not only firms’ 
incentives to engage in OI but also the extent to which firms can appropriate value from innovations 
resulting from external collaborations.  
Because differences in innovation-supporting institutions exist not only between but also within 
countries (Nelson, 1988), innovation is strongly influenced by subnational level institutions of a given 
country. Although this study focuses on China which is a large economy and features the growing 
importance of subnational regions due to recent administrative decentralization (Kafouros et al., 2015), 
we should note that many other emerging countries such as Israel, Malaysia, Uruguay and Kenya are also 
characterized by polycentric institutions like China  (Choi et al., 2015).  Hence, although the importance 
of subnational regions may vary across countries, accounting for the role of institutions at this level is 
important for understanding of what account for the effectiveness of OI.   
3. Hypotheses 
Although many emerging countries have IPR laws on paper, their enforcement provides innovators with 
little protection from imitators (Keupp et al., 2012). Strong IPP enforcement induces innovation by 
discouraging opportunistic behavior and reducing the risks of expropriation by collaborators (Ang et al., 
2014). However, although the applicable IPRs laws and international treaties are the same within China, 
there exist significant differences in the enforcement of the IPP laws across regions (Kafouros et al., 2015) 
because of the uneven social and economic development across these regions (Fan et al., 2011).  
We should recognize that though IPR is important for firms to appropriate value from innovations, 
the OI strategy and IPR protection and enforcement may be incompatible. OI involves disclosure of some 
of the firm’s knowledge to external partners, but this may be conflicting with the needs of the protection 
of that knowledge from unwanted leakage, creating what Laursen and Salter (2014) call a ‘paradox of 
openness’. Despite these arguments, however, we contend that the performance-enhancing effect of OI is 
higher in regions with stronger IPR enforcement than in regions with weaker IPR enforcement.  
Strong IPR enforcement raises the costs of imitation and infringements, enabling firms to exploit 
ideas and IP generated from collaborative OI projects. EMEs in regions with stronger IPR enforcement 
receive greater protection from patent infringements and thus have more confidence in disclosing 
confidential information to external collaborators (Ang et al., 2014). As a result, they would be more 
willing to share resources, devote more efforts to technological collaborations and transfer technology and 
skills to their partners without destroying any competitive advantages they might have (Li, 2012). This in 
turn helps EMEs enhance the efficiency of OI and increase output in patents and sales from new products.  
By contrast, in regions with weaker IPR enforcement, under-developed institutions spark fears of 
expropriation of proprietary technology. EMEs will find it difficult to gain protection against behaviors 
such as counterfeiting in R&D collaborations and to follow normal legal processes to mitigate the risk of 
appropriation by partners (Ang et al., 2014). In such cases, EMEs are reluctant to engage in OI, fearing 
that the opportunistic behavior of their partners will increase transaction costs and lower economic 
payoffs from innovation (Kafouros et al., 2015). Therefore, although openness may on average enhance 
innovation performance, we expect this effect to vary across subnational regions depending on the 
strength of IPR enforcement. Hence:  
H1. The positive effects of open innovation on innovation performance will be higher for EMEs in 
regions with a higher-level IPR enforcement than for EMEs in regions with a lower level of IPR 
enforcement.  
The development of factor markets refers to the extent to which the factors of production or 
innovation, such as labor, capital, and natural resources, are determined by the interplay of demand and 
supply forces rather than non-market forces (Hong et al., 2015). Although China has made great progress 
in transition to a market-based system since 1978, the Chinese government initially prioritized the 
development of China’s eastern coastal regions only, e.g., by encouraging trade and FDI. As a result, the 
development of factor markets is heterogeneous across subnational regions within the country (Fan et al., 
2007; 2011). Such cross-regional variations in factor market development influence the ability of EMEs 
to take advantage of OI and enhance innovation performance.  
In regions characterized by relatively well-developed factor markets, market-based mechanisms of 
economic exchanges reduce information asymmetry and uncertainty and lower transaction and search 
costs (North, 1990). In such regions, EMEs can take advantage of well-developed external factor markets 
to coordinate the operations of their innovation value chains. They will have more opportunities to 
broaden their innovation networks, gain access to advanced factors, and benefit from exchanges of 
factors. This in turn reduces transaction costs and business uncertainty about the legitimate ways of 
creating innovation from collaborations with external actors. For example, well-developed public equity 
markets can facilitate OI by serving to allocate capital,  ameliorate problems associated with information 
and transaction costs involved (Levine, 1997), and make financing easily available for firms. Because 
information is less asymmetric in such regions, EMEs can relatively easily search for appropriate partners 
with lower cost.  
By contrast, in regions with a lower level of factor market development, the markets for factors are 
dysfunctional (Fan and Wang, 2007) or are characterized by non-market forces such as relationship-based 
exchanges (Peng, 2003), burdensome regulatory restrictions (Hong et al., 2015), and political favoritism 
(Hong et al., 2015). In such cases, EMEs are likely to engage in costly market transactions, which makes 
searching for factors costly and hampers the firm’s ability to capitalize on OI (Makino et al., 2002). EMEs 
are likely reluctant to open their innovation process because it is difficult to evaluate market information 
and curb opportunistic behavior (Lin et al., 2009). As a result, they have to rely on relational exchanges 
(Peng, 2003) which increase transaction costs and impede firms’ ability to create innovation through 
external collaborations. Hence:  
H2. The positive effects of open innovation on innovation performance will be higher for EMEs in 
regions with a higher level of factor market development than in regions with a lower level of factor 
market development.  
Market intermediaries can be defined as “economic agents who coordinate and arbitrate transactions 
between a group of suppliers and customers.” (Wu, 2004: 67) and they include various types of 
intermediaries such as trade agents, financial intermediaries and innovation intermediaries. The 
development of intermediation markets in this study refers to the extent to which organizations use 
market intermediaries rather than their own means to coordinate economic exchanges. In the pre-reform 
era of China, intermediation markets were almost non-existent because government acted as 
intermediaries for overcoming market failure and for achieving equality of distribution. Although 
intermediaries have emerged following the economic reform programme implemented since 1978, the 
development of intermediation markets is highly skewed in terms of spatial distribution within the 
country (Fan et al., 2011). We argue that these variations in intermediation market development influence 
the effectiveness of OI for EMEs in different subnational regions.  
In regions with more developed intermediation markets, intermediaries are more effective, provide 
reliable market information and formal infrastructures and thus facilitate market-based exchanges 
(Hoskisson et al., 2000). As a result, intermediaries in such regions are able to help EMEs enhance the 
effectiveness of OI by better linking firms with complementary interests and by providing them with 
information about potential exchange parties (McEvily and Zaheer, 1999). For example, well-developed 
innovation intermediaries such as venture capital firms in such regions can encourage external 
technological collaborations by reducing transaction costs and by facilitating information dissemination 
(Chesbrough, 2003). They can therefore contribute to the effectiveness of OI by decreasing innovation 
costs and time needed for opportunity search and the likelihood of finding appropriate paths to create 
value from appropriation of innovations.  
By contrast, in regions with less developed intermediation markets, intermediaries have not been 
fully developed (Fan et al., 2011) or they are less efficient. These conditions constrain EMEs’ access to 
reliable market information and complementary resources, increase business uncertainty and transaction 
cost for exchanges of factors and thus hampers the firm’s ability capitalize on OI strategy (Makino et al., 
2002). Also, less developed markets of intermediation increases information asymmetry between 
exchanging parties that seek complementary knowledge, technology and resources. As a result, EMEs in 
those markets have to conduct costly search for factors, information and collaborators and tend to engage 
in unfair and opportunistic activities (Li and Atuahene-Gima, 2001) which constrains their ability to take 
advantage of OI and improve innovation performance.  
H3. The positive effects of open innovation on innovation performance will be higher for EMEs in 
regions with a higher level of development in intermediation markets than in regions with a lower level of 
development in intermediation markets.  
 
4. Data and methods 
4.1. Sample 
Our data is drawn from a unique firm-level dataset entitled the ‘Innovation-Oriented Firms Database’ 
(IOFD)1, which is compiled annually by the Ministry of Science and Technology of China (MSTC). The 
MSTC collects such information as R&D expenditures, R&D collaborations and R&D output in order to 
monitor the development of Chinese high-tech firms and provide potential inputs to policymaking. The 
database contains 443 innovative firms across China’s regions for the period of 2008 and 2011. The 
selection of firms by MSTC is based on five dimensions of performance: the number of granted patents 
per thousand R&D personnel, R&D intensity, the ratio of new product sales to total sales, labor 
productivity, and innovations related to organizational change and management. Because this annual 
survey is mandatory for all qualified companies, it reduces the possibility of bias due to low response 
rates, which often happens in surveys. We checked for unusable or unreliable observations and excluded 
firms without complete information, as well as firms with missing values and outliers. We finally obtained 
a sample consisting of 438 firms between 2008 and 2011. 
                                                          
1 The same dataset was used by Kafouros et al. (2015). 
Although the sample does not seem large relative to the population of Chinese high-tech firms, the 
surveyed firms are well represented in terms of ownership, industrial and geographic coverage (Kafouros 
et al., 2015). Nevertheless, to test the representativeness of the sample, we collected data from Annual 
Report of Industrial Enterprise Statistics in 2011, obtained from the State Statistical Bureau of China. The 
database includes manufacturing firms that account for about 90 percent of total output in most industries. 
To match our sample which contains innovation oriented high-tech firms only (many high-tech Chinese 
firms just involve OEM without substantial R&D activities), we derived a further sub-sample (5,606 
firms with above average R&D intensity) out of the 11,212 high-tech firms in 2011. We then used this 
sub-sample as the ‘population’ and tested the extent to which our sample represents the ‘population’ in 
terms of R&D intensity and innovation performance by conducting t-tests. The results show no significant 
differences between our sample and the ‘population’ (the t ratios are 0.679 and 1.576 for R&D intensity 
and innovation performance, respectively). Therefore, although our sample may be considered not very 
large, it can well represent the population of innovation oriented high-tech or R&D intensive firms in 
China. 
 
4.2. Measures  
4.2.1. Dependent variable 
Our dependent variable is innovation performance which is measured by the ratio of new product sales to 
total sales (Kafouros et al., 2015). Because several firms have a value of zero for new product sales, we 
use ln (New product sales share +0.1) in the model. New products are defined by the State Statistical 
Bureau of China as those goods that feature stronger functions or extended scope of usage as a result of 
the adoption of new structures, designs or manufacturing techniques (Wang et al., 2015). Because new 
product sales incorporate both market acceptance and non-patentable innovations, it has been widely used 
in previous studies (e.g., Berchicci, 2013; Laursen and Salter, 2006). By contrast, patent-based measures 
fail to capture innovations that are not amenable for patenting and innovations that the company does not 
want to patent.  
4.2.2. Independent variable 
R&D openness is measured as the ratio of external R&D expenditure to total R&D expenditure. The 
external R&D expenditure covers all expenses related to collaborations with URIs, domestic and foreign 
firms, government agencies, foreign agencies, and the purchasing of foreign technology and facilities. 
These sources largely fall into the categories of ‘market’ and ‘institutional’ in the categorization of 
Lausen and Salter (2006). The high diversity of external knowledge sources that our sampled firms get 
access to increases their ability to adapt changes and therefore to innovate (Lausen and Salter, 2006; Luo 
et al., 2017). We measure region-specific IPR enforcement by the accumulated ratio of closed IPR cases 
to the total number of legal IPR cases entertained (Kafouros et al., 2015). Because there are significant 
discrepancies between the written laws and their enforcement at the local and subnational levels in China 
(Ang et al., 2014), our measure better capture IPR protection by focusing on the effectiveness of IPR 
enforcement rather than merely on the existence of IPR laws. Both region-specific factor market 
development and region-specific intermediation market development were constructed from the 
marketization index developed by NERI (Fan et al., 2007, 2011; Hong et al., 2015). The former covers 
financial markets, labour market and technology markets, while the latter includes market intermediaries 
(e.g., legal services, accounting services and industry associations) and innovation intermediaries. The 
NERI index provided a score for both variables for each of China’s provinces, municipalities and 
autonomous regions and is widely used by scholars (e.g., Hong et al., 2015; Wang et al., 2015). A greater 
score indicates better market development.  
 
4.2.3. Control variables 
First, firm size is measured by the natural logarithm of total number of employees. Second, firm age is 
defined by the number of years since the firm was founded is included. Third, R&D intensity is measured 
by the ratio of R&D expenditure to the number of employees. Fourth, human resources are defined as the 
ratio of the number of technology people to the total number of employees. Fifth, return to assets is 
measured by the ratio of profit to total assets. Sixth, FDI penetration is defined as the ratio of amount of 
FDI to GDP in a region. Seventh, stock listed is defined as a dummy which equals to 1 for a company 
listed in stock markets. Finally, some additional dummies are included to account for idiosyncrasies 
associated with industry, region, and time variations. Table I summarizes the variables.  
 (Insert Table I about here) 
4.2.4. Descriptive analysis 
Table II shows that the average share of new product sales is 0.455 which is quite high but is not 
surprising because all firms in our sample are innovation oriented high-tech companies. Because these 
firms operate in high-tech industries characterized by short product life cycles, they must rely on the 
development of new products to remain competitive. The increasing new product sales share over the 
sample period was accompanied by rising R&D openness and improving IPR enforcement and the 
development of factor and intermediation markets in subnational regions, highlighting the important role 
of OI and improving institutional conditions. The share of R&D expenditure accounted for by URIs is 
less than 50%, suggesting that the R&D openness of the sampled firms is not largely driven by academic 
collaborations.  
(Insert Table II about here) 
4.3. Statistical modeling 
We use the following regression specification to test our hypotheses: 
Yit = α + Xit β + Mit γ + (Xit × Mit)ρ + Ζitδ + λj+λk + λt + εit(1) 
Where, Yit  is the innovation performance, Xit  is the R&D openness, Mit  denotes the three 
moderators - IPR enforcement, factor market development and intermediation market development, Xit ×
Mit is the interaction terms between R&D openness and each of the three moderators,Zit is the control 
variables ,λj, λk, and λt are industry, region and time dummies, respectively, and εit is the error term. 
Table III reports correlations among the variables used in the model. The variance inflation factor 
(VIF) values ranged from 1.05 to 3.68, well below the cutoff threshold of 10. Nevertheless, we mean-
centered variables in the interaction terms to avoid problems of multicollinearity (Wang et al., 2015).  In 
addition, we lagged all independent variables and interactions by one year to account for the fact that 
some of the predicted effects require time to materialize and also to offset any possible endogeneity 
concerns. Because the dependent variable—R&D performance has upper and lower bounds (i.e. ranges 
from 0 to 100), a panel-data Tobit model is applied (Wooldridge, 2002). Following Kafouros et al. (2015), 
random-effects models are used because the time period is short in our dataset and fixed-effects estimates 
cannot be made in a panel Tobit model. 
(Insert Table III about here) 
5. Results 
Table IV reports the results. Model 1 includes control variables only. R&D openness is added to Model 2 
which serves as the baseline model. The coefficient of the R&D openness variable is positive and 
statistically significant2. This result highlights the importance of opening up of innovation process for 
developing innovation and thus lends support for the theory of open innovation (Chesbrough, 2003). The 
interaction terms between R&D openness and each of the three moderators are added in Models 3-5, 
respectively. The interaction term in Model 3 is positive and statistically significant. This suggests that the 
effect of OI on innovation performance is higher in regions with a higher level of IPR enforcement, 
supporting Hypothesis 1. Similarly, the interaction term in Model 4 is also positive and significant, 
corroborating Hypothesis 2. This result suggests that the effect of R&D openness on innovation 
performance is pronounced in regions with a higher level of factor market development. The interaction 
term in Model 5 is marginally significant, lending weak support to Hypothesis 3. These results remain 
                                                          
2 We have tried to include a squared term of the R&D openness variable but the coefficient of this variable is insignificant. This 
suggests that our data do not support a curvilinear relationship between R&D openness and innovation performance (Berchicci, 
2013; Laursen and Salter, 2006). 
qualitatively unchanged in Model 6 which is a full model including all independent variables and 
interaction terms.  
(Insert Table IV about here) 
Robustness test 
Although we control for possible estimation biases by incorporating several variables that account 
for firm characteristics, improvements in innovation performance can still lead to increase in R&D 
openness, causing a reverse-causality explanation of our results. We used an instrumental variable (IV) 
approach to solve this potential problem. To do so, it is necessary to choose a valid IV which should be 
highly correlated with the explanatory variable but has no (or very low) correlation with the error term. 
We use industry-level R&D openness - defined as the average ratio of the firm’s external R&D 
expenditure to the total R&D expenditures in an industry, as the instrument for R&D openness. We 
choose this variable because it may account for an important part of a firm’s R&D openness at the firm 
level, but it is less correlated with the individual firm’s innovation performance. Moreover, R&D 
activities are not concentrated in a few large firms in high-tech industries which are emerging and 
dynamic sectors and are highly competitive. Our empirical tests show that the IV can explain 12.2% of 
the variance in R&D openness at the firm level (i.e., a strong predictor of the endogenous variable) but 
only 4.2% of the variance in innovation performance (i.e. it is a weak predictor of the dependent variable). 
We use this instrument to conduct the Dubin-Wu-Hausman tests. The results in Table 4 show that we 
cannot reject the null hypothesis in all models, indicating that the predictor variable (R&D openness) is 
exogenous. Second, we use robust standard errors by employing the bootstrap method to overcome 
possible heterogeneity and autocorrelation problems in panel data. The results are very similar to those 
reported in Table 4 except for the coefficient of firm size which is becomes insignificant. Third, we used 
an approach that is employed in prior studies (e.g., Zhang et al., 2010) and regressed the R&D openness 
on innovation performance. The analysis indicates that this relationship was statistically insignificant and 
thus the possibility of reverse causality can be ruled out in the current study3.  
6. Discussion and conclusion 
First, we find robust evidence that region-specific institutional idiosyncrasies, namely, levels of IPR 
enforcement and factor market development, positively moderate the performance effects of OI. These 
findings underscore the important role of institutional forces in unlocking the potential of OI strategy in 
emerging markets. As discussed in Section 2.1, previous studies have generated mixed predictions 
regarding the outcomes of OI.  Our findings help to reconcile these conflicting predictions and advance 
this body of literature by demonstrating that variations in innovation performance can be explained not 
only by the degree of openness per se but also by institutional differences across subnational regions of a 
given country. Our study helps to explain why and how OI is more effective for some firms than for 
others.  
Second, our study shows that the effect of OI is more pronounced in regions with stronger IPR 
enforcement and in regions with better-developed factor markets. These findings are intriguing because 
they indicate that while firms in a given country face the same macro-level institutions (North, 1990), 
those institutional forces at subnational levels are capable of explaining variations in the performance 
outcomes of OI. Our study therefore shifts the debate from whether OI matters for firm innovativeness to 
the question of how and under what institutional conditions it enhances innovation performance. Our 
attention on region-specific institutions complements and advances prior research on institutions and 
innovation by showing subnational regions to be a key unit of analysis for the determinants of the 
performance outcomes of OI in large emerging economies such as China. By showing the importance of 
capturing intra-national institutional diversity, our study also contributes to a broader understanding of 
‘how institutions matter’ (Wright et al., 2005) and ‘which institutions’ are most relevant to a specific 
context or decision (Xu and Meyer, 2013).   
                                                          
3 The results are available from the authors.  
However, we find that region-specific intermediation market development only has a weak positive 
effect on the relationship between R&D openness and innovation performance. Our tentative explanation 
is that the marketization index which we used to measure intermediation market development may not 
comprehensively capture all types of intermediaries that support firms’ external R&D activities. Another 
possibility is that Chinese firms tend to collaborate increasingly with intermediaries in other regions. In 
such cases, the intermediation market development in their ‘home regions’ would matter less for 
implementing the OI strategy.  
Our findings offer guidelines for EME managers by showing how they can benefit from OI by 
taking advantage of region-specific institutional environment (i.e. IPR environment and factor markets) in 
which their firms are embedded. EME managers should concern not only the extent to which they open 
the process of innovation but also treat regional institutions as an endogenous element of their firms’ OI 
strategy. Instead of viewing the institutional environment as a source of contingencies to which 
organizations must adapt, EMEs should proactively and systematically integrate institutional advantages 
into their OI strategy. In terms of policy implications, our findings suggest that regional governments 
should strengthen IPR enforcement and encourage development of factor markets in their jurisdictions in 
order to help firms take advantage of OI strategy and enhance innovation. As these suggestions focus on 
external environments, they differ from prescriptions that emphasize merely how firms should open their 
internal R&D processes.  
Nevertheless, this study has several limitations. First, it focuses on the interplay between open 
innovation strategy and regional institutional differences and, as a result, it places less emphasis on 
institutional variations across industries. Because each industry is coordinated by a unique configuration 
of institutional arrangements (Hollingsworth, 2000), future research should consider how industry-
specific institutions influence the relationship between open innovation and firm innovativeness. Second, 
because we use data for Chinese high-tech firms, care should be taken to generalize our findings to other 
emerging economies and also to low-tech firms. Third, although both firms and the institutional 
environment in emerging markets evolve (Hong et al., 2015), the time length of our data does not allow 
the research to examine the co-evolution of firms and institutions and its consequences for open 
innovation. This is a promising research topic that warrants further investigation because it helps us 
understand how the value of open innovation can increase or decrease with dynamic shifts over time in 
institutional environment.  
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 Table I 
Definitions and descriptions of variables 
 
Variables Definition Mean S.D. 
Innovation performance ln(New product share*100 +1) 3.470 1.121 
R&D openness Ratio of external R&D expenditure to total R&D 
expenditure 
0.101 0.139 
IPR enforcement Ratio of accumulated closed IPR cases to the total 
number of legal IPR cases entertained 
0.895 0.070 
Factor market development Province-specific factor market development index 
by Fan et al. (2008-2011) 
6.275 1.538 
Interm. market development Province-specific intermediation market development 
index by Fan et al. (2008-2011) 
5.122 3.100 
Firm age The number of years since the firm was founded 13.30 7.059 
Firm size ln(Number of employees) 8.060 1.854 
Share of gov. funding Ratio of R&D expenditure from government sources 
over total R&D expenditure 
0.123 0.228 
Human resources Ratio of the number of technology people to the 
number of employees 
0.286 0.193 
Return to assets Ratio of profits to total assets 0.078 0.090 
R&D intensity Ratio of R&D expenditure to the total number of 
employees  
4.356 7.535 
FDI penetration Ratio of amount of FDI to GDP in a region 0.029 0.018 









































2008 0.068 0.368 0.411 0.889 6.152 4.588 
2009 0.080 0.356 0.432 0.889 6.244 5.058 
2010 0.134 0.401 0.480 0.901 6.263 5.267 
2011 0.120 0.420 0.497 0.902 6.441 5.574 












































 Table III.  
Correlation matrix 
 
Variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 
1. Innovation Perf. 1.000            
2. R&D openness -0.071 1.000           
3. IPR enforcement -0.158 0.026 1.000          
4.Factor market 0.062 -0.071 0.058 1.000         
5. Interm. market -0.023 -0.061 0.121 0.480 1.000        
6.Firm age -0.070 -0.069 0.007 0.120 0.113 1.000       
7. Firm size -0.194 0.051 0.100 0.212 0.224 0.315 1.000      
8. Share of gov. funding  -0.017 0.015 0.039 -0.047 -0.021 -0.125 -0.278 1.000     
9. Human resources 0.142 -0.125 -0.022 0.025 0.004 -0.144 -0.515 0.286 1.000    
10. Return to assets 0.045 0.068 -0.039 0.026 -0.018 -0.086 -0.189 -0.031 0.145 1.000   
11. R&D intensity 0.037 0.043 0.074 0.103 0.105 -0.029 -0.144 -0.020 0.225 -0.004 1.000  
12. FDI penetration 0.016 -0.045 0.090 0.511 0.411 0.020 -0.018 0.029 0.138 0.033 0.092 1.000 




























Table IV.  
Regression results 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Independent variable       
R&D openness  0.322* 0.272 0.341* 0.324* 0.266 
Moderators       
IPR enforcement   -1.454**   -1.180** 
Factor market    0.057**  0.239*** 
Interm. market     -0.007 -0.090 
Interactions       
R&D open*IPR 
enforcement 
  4.047***   3.342** 
R&D open*Factor market    0.022**  0.027** 
R&D open* Interm. 
market 





Control variables       
Firm age -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 -0.009 -0.008 -0.008 
Firm size -0.054* -0.055* -0.047 -0.065** -0.054* -0.059** 
Share of gov. funding 0.092 0.084 0.074 0.084 0.085 0.078 
Human resources 0.525** 0.568*** 0.601*** 0.548*** 0.571*** 0.585*** 
Return to assets  0.438 0.422 0.427 0.400 0.412 0.308 
R&D intensity -0.001 -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 -0.002 
FDI penetration 1.393 1.419 1.447 -0.454 1.701 -2.362 
Stock listed 0.075 0.081 0.068 0.088 0.079 0.103 
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Industry dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Region dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1,752 1752 
Wald Chi2 test 141.4*** 143.8*** 157.2*** 149.8*** 144.6*** 185.4*** 
Log likelihood function -2348 -2346 -2341 -2345 -2346 -2331 
Left or right censored 59 59 59 59 59 59 
Rho 0.501 0.504 0.496 0.498 0.505 0.484 
D-W-Hausman 10.47 10.63 10.96 10.20 10.57 9.09 
Notes: ＊ p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, ***p<0.001 
 
 
